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The NonmajO{itarian Difficulty:
Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary*

Theoretical and descriptive studies of the Supreme Court exhibit a curious
parallel. Both usually begin from the premise that judicial review is "a
deviant institution in a democratic society." Much normative work claims
that independent judicial policymaking is rarely legitimate in a democracy
because, with few exceptions, elected officials rather than appointed
judges should resolve social controversies. In a frequently cited passage,
Alexander Bickel asserts that the Supreme Court is "a countermajoritarian force" in our system of government. Much empirical work, by
comparison, insists that independent judicial policymaking seldom takes
place in a democracy because, with few exceptions, judges appointed and
confirmed by elected officials sustain whatever social policies are enacted
by the dominant national coalition. Robert Dahl observes that it is "unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion
of Supreme Court justices would long hold to norms of Right or Justice
substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.~' 1
Few studies of the Supreme Court, however, integrate these theoretical
and descriptive insights.2 Indeed, the claim that independent judicial
policymaking is-rarely legitimate in a democracy is not wholly compatible
*Walter Dean Burnham, Robert Dahl, Wallace Mendelson, Michael Munger,Julia Bess Frank,
and numerous reviewers significantly improved the logic and coherence of this paper.
I. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962}, 128, 16; Robert A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," journal of Public Law 6 (1957): 291.
2. Rogers Smith notes that in contemporary academic law, "questions of fact and
law ... more often go[] in parallel than in real communication with one another." Rogers
M. Smith, "The New Institutionalism and Normative Theory: Reply to Professor Barber," in
Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, eds., Studies in American Political Development: An Annual
3 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 77 n.7.
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with the claim that independent judicial policymaking seldom takes place
in a democracy. Empirical works typically suggest that most normative
analyses of the Supreme Court are oflittle relevance to the actual practice
of judicial review in the United States. If, as Richard Funston maintains,
"the Court [can] not long block the desires of a dominant political coalition" and if "the Court [will] not often wish to block the majority will"
(emphasis in original), 3 then very few judicial decisions present instances
of the countermajoritarian difficulty and the rare offending ruling will be
abandoned shortly after being handed down. The Court may be "the
forum of principle" in American life, 4 but the principles that justices articulate, Dahl and others point out, are likely to be those favored by members
of the existing lawmaking majority.5 Normative works, in contrast, question whether empirical analyses of the Supreme Court adequately explain
what the justices have historically done. Many of the best-known and most
influential exercises of judicial power, academic lawyers recognize, do not
simply reinforce the principles favored by members of the existing lawmaking majority. Dred Scott v. Sandford6 did not endorse the slavery policies
preferred by mainstream jacksonian Democrats; Roe v. Wade 7 announced
abortion policies that were not being championed by either the Nixon
administration or the Democratic majority in Congress. Constitutional and
democratic theorists find judicial review problematic because, although
elected officials appoint and confirm unelected justices, the national judiciary consistently makes decisions that seem different from those previously reached by the national legislature.
This paper contends that both conventional explanations and justifications of independent judicial policymaking are based on inaccurate and
incomplete understandings of the relationships between justices and
elected officials. Rather than treat judicial review as a practice that either
sustains or rejects the measures favored by lawmaking majorities, theoretical and descriptive studies of the Supreme Court should pay closer attention to the constitutional dialogues that take place between American
governing institutions on crosscutting issues that internally divide the
existing lawmaking majority. Historically, the justices have most often
exercised their power to declare state and federal practices unconstitutional only when the dominant national coalition is unable or unwilling to
settle some public dispute. The justices in t~se circumstances do not
merely fill a void created by the legislative failure to choose between
competing political proposals. On the contrary, prominent elected officials
consciously invite the judiciary to resolve those political controversies that
they cannot or would rather not address.
3. Richard Funston, "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections," American Political Science Review 69 (1975): 796.
4. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Pnnciple (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

1985), 33-71.
5. See, e.g., Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy;" Paul Brest, "Who Decides?"
Southern California Law Review 58 (1985).
6. 19 How. 393 (1857).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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This practice of foisting disruptive political debates off on the Supreme
Court is grounded in certain enduring structures of American politics. In
two-party systems, mainstream politicians advance their interests by diverting difficult, crosscutting issues to such "peripheral mechanisms" 8 as
the nationaljudiciary. Elected officials in the United States encourage or
tacitly support judicial policymaking both as a means of avoiding political
responsibility for making tough decisions and as a means of pursuing
controversial policy goals that they cannot publicly advance through open
legislative and electoral politics. The Supreme Court has proven receptive
to these invitations, p<l{ticularly when the justices share the values of the
elite or presidential wing of the dominant national coalition. Legislative
deference to the judiciary is, thus, not an isolated occurrence, but one way
that established politicians have fought the "conflict between conflicts"
that Schattschneider and others recognize as endemic to American politics, if not to any political regime. 9
"The countermajoritarian difficulty" does not provide an adequate starting point for thinking about an institution that typically makes policies only
in response to legislative stalemates and invitations. Scholars might more
profitably think about judicial review as presenting "the nonmajoritarian
difficulty" when the real controversy is between different members of the
dominant national coalition, or "the clashing majority difficulty" when the
real controversy is between lawmaking majorities of different governing
institutions. The theoretical issues raised by such exercises of judicial
power cannot be resolved by such ritual incantations as, "Unelectedjudges
ought not to make policies in a democracy." Rather, on the basis of more
realistic descriptions of the forces that influence Supreme Court decisionmaking, scholars might offer more accurate assessments of the extent to
whichjudicial review in the United States promotes or retards such basic
features of democratic governance as deliberate decision-making,
majoritarianism, and political accountability.

THE STRUCTURE OF LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE TO THE JUDICIARY
Judicial rulings present something of a paradox to stud~nts of American
government. Leaders of the dominant national coalition carefully screen
prospective justices to ensure sympathetic judgments, but the federal judiciary nevertheless often makes decisions at odds with the political status
quo. Independent judicial policymaking seems both anomalous and countermajoritarian, however, only if scholars assume that legislators wish to
bear the responsibility for resolving conflicts that divide the body politic.
In fact, mainstream politicians are often more interested in keeping social
controversies off the political agenda than in considering the merits of
8. Alvin Cohan, "Abortion as a Marginal Issue: The Use of Peripheral Mechanisms in
Britain and the United States," inJoni Lovenduski and Joyce Outshoorn, eds., The New Politics
of Abortion (London: Sage Publications, 1986), 33.
9. E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America
(Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1975), 60-74.
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alternative settlements. When disputes arise that most elected officials
would rather not address publicly, Supreme Court justices may serve the
interests of the political status quo by making policy, taking public responsibility for making policy, and making policy favored by political elites.
Judicial policymaking in these circumstances cannot be accurately described as either majoritarian or countermajoritarian; it takes place when
and because no legislative majority has formed.
Social scientists and academic lawyers will improve their understanding
of much independent judicial policymaking if they examine the strategies
adopted by the leaders of dominant political coalitions when confronted
with crosscutting issues that threaten to disrupt the existing bases of partisan cleavage. Such politicians, whom I shall call "party moderates," rise
to power by articulating or advancing those positions that unite their
followers. Ambitious Republicans in 1860 cried, "No new slave territories!" Today, they shout, "No new taxes!" As the example of the antebellum GOP suggests, political aspirants typically champion those policies
that have broad support within their coalitions, even when they recognize
that the general electorate may not support those positions as enthusiastically as their partisans. Thus, party moderates may be moderates only
within their parties; their positions may appear immoderate from other
perspectives. Abraham Lincoln may have been regarded as a radical abolitionist by the majority of his contemporaries, but he obtained his party's
nomination for the presidency primarily because his position on slavery
was closer to that of the median Republican voter than the more extreme
proposals proffered by William Seward.
Previous scholarship correctly recognizes that party moderates attempt
to forestall any judicial effort that interferes with the achievement of policy
objectives that unite their coalition. Members of the lawmaking majority
will assert that the Constitution vests the people's elected representatives
with the power to settle those social controversies that divide the major
parties and to advance fairly specific proposals for resolving those issues.
They nominate and confirm prospective justices whom they have good
reason to believe share and can be expected 'to sustain their constitutional
and policy preferences. 1 0 Because the Court rarely disappoints presidents
on issues of immediate interest to them and their followers, it rarely challenges the legislative programs enacted by law~king majorities. Historically, justices have engaged in classic countermajoritarian behavior only in
those relatively brief periods when members of a newly formed dominant
national coalition have not yet had the time necessary to install their
adherents on the bench. II
10. See Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy," 284; Donald R. Songer, "The Relevance of Policy Values for the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees," Law and Society,
13 (1979); William E. Hulbary and Thomas G. Walker, "The Supreme Court Selection
Process: Presidential Motivation and Judicial Performance," Western Political Quarterly, 33
(1980): 186, 189.
ll. See Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy;" Funston, "The Supreme Court."
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Most politicians in power, however, would not have the federal judiciary
defer to all legislative judgments. Party moderates complain of unwarranted judicial activism only when their policy preferences are declared
unconstitutional. Members of the dominant national coalition openly approve of judicial policymaking when the courts are asked to protect "the
rights of national majorities against local interests" or to strike down
legislation enacted by a deposed majority coalition. 12 Such wishes often
become the justices' commands. The Supreme Court, not surprisingly,
normally supports the winners of American national politics when they
lose locally. Judicial poli~making in these circumstances might be described as presenting "the present national majoritarian difficulty." Thus,
the Taft Court struck down state laws inconsistent with the probusiness,
laissez-faire policies of the Harding/Coolidge administration. Lawmaking
majorities naturally do their best to facilitate such favorable judicial policymaking. In recent years, for example, presidents Reagan and Bush have
appointed justices who were known to be hostile to local affirmative action
policies and possibly interested in using the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment to compensate property owners harmed by neighborhood
environmental regulations.
These well-known observations, however, only apply to those constitutional issues that divide the two major political parties. Many prominent
cases stem from public disputes that crosscut existing political alignments.
When confronted with these controversies, justices cannot legitimate or
advance the agenda of the dominant national coalition in any simple sense.
Members of the lawmaking majority may be both the leading proponents
and opponents of the policy under constitutional attack. The New Deal
Democratic party included Southerners committed to maintaining racial
segregation and Northern intellectuals who strongly opposed Jim Crow
institutions. During the Carter administration, the presidential wing of the
Democratic party vigorously objected to legislative vetoes routinely attached to administrative regulations by the legislative wing of that party.
Asking the justices in such circumstances to defer to the lawmaking majority begs the question. The justices must either choose between different
representatives of the same lawmaking majority or between representatives of different lawmaking majorities.
Judicial efforts to identify the policies favored by the dominant national
coalition are also likely to prove unavailing because mainstream politicians
do their best to avoid taking firm public stands on those matters that
internally divide their coalition. Speeches, issues papers, and campaign
promises that call attention to such disruptive disputes distract partisans
from their common purpose and .threaten party solidarity. Hence, although elected officials constantly trumpet their positions on some matters, they remain eerily silent on others. Republican party leaders in 1860,
for example, stressed their common hostility to slavery in the territories
12. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy," 282, 286-291; Martin Shapiro, Courts: A
Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981}, 22-23.
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and suppressed debate over those economic policies that had previously
been disputed by the former Whigs and Democrats among their rank and
file. In a commentary on abortion politics, Amy Gutmann points out that
"rarely have so many public officials worked so hard to say so little about
an issue on the minds of so many citizens."l3
In order to preserve their political coalitions and personal status, the
leaders of both the majority and minority party typically, when faced with
a crosscutting issue, adopt a variety of"defensive" strategies. James Sundquist notes that
they try to straddle it, to change the subject, to find policy compromises that
will conciliate the polar forces developing within the party, and to nominate
candidates who are uncommitted and able to make gestures in both directions,
all the while hoping that the issue will somehow solve itself or disappear.l4

When events demonstrate that a potentially disruptive controversy is not
going to vanish, politicians attempt to depoliticize that dispute by developing or making use of various means of conflict resolution that seem far
removed from national electoral politics. Waving the banner offederalism,
elected officials claim that state majorities bear the responsibility for resolving a crosscutting issue. Local political leaders are able to adopt safe
positions on contested national issues because those debates may not
splinter their smaller, more homogenous constituencies (or at least the
members of their coalitions). Antebellum nominees for governor of South
Carolina or Maine could confidently make assertions about slavery that
would have ruined a presidential candidate. In Building the New American
State, Stephen Skowronek identifies another tactic national elites have used
in order to avoid making controversial public policies. Late-nineteenth13. James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political
Parties in the United States (revised edition) (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1983), 79; Amy Gutmann, "No Common Ground," The New Republic, 203 (October 22,
1990): 43.
Some formal theorists claim that minority-party moderates, if they are rational, will seek
to inject into politics new issues that might splinter the dominant national coalition (William
H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986]), but
history suggests that prominent leaders of the political opposition,have a vested interest in
preserving the existing bases of partisan cleavage. Realignments have not only changed the
balance of partisan strength, they have created extr~dinary opportunities for younger
insurgents to challenge the seasoned political leadership of the established parties. AI Smith
and john W. Davis, the losing Democratic candidates for the presidency in 1928 and 1924,
were no more at home in the New Deal Democratic party than were Herbert Hoover and
Calvin Coolidge. Their experience (and the experience of the late-nineteenth-century leadership of the Republican party during the Progressive era) suggests that party moderates are
either incapable of abandoning the issue positions that they have articulated throughout their
careers or are too identified with those issues in the public mind to be able to compete with
new political entrepreneurs not saddled with the losing positions of the past. (See Sundquist,
1983, pp. 43-44, 177-180.) Furthermore, leadership in the opposition party does have many
rewards. In addition to the perks associated with such positions as House minority whip,
political events may occur that temporarily enable the weaker political coalition to control
the national government.
14. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 307.
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century party moderates, he points out, fought the threat of partisan debate over railroad regulation by creating a nonpartisan administrative
agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, which they charged with
reforming the national transportation system, subject only to vague guidelines. Elected officials from then on deflected public demands that Congress adopt industrial policies by asserting that economic regulation was
a subject for bureaucratic expertise, and not for political disputation_l5
Courts offer similar opportunities for pushing unwanted political fights
off the political agenda. The judiciary is a preexisting, nonpartisan institution that is constitutionally authorized to resolve specific controversies.
Moreover, independent policy entrepreneurs will have already brought (or
can easily be encouraged to bring) the relevant issues to the attention of
the Supreme Court. As much political science scholarship recognizes,
when marginal groups lack the political resources necessary to forge a
dominant national coalition, they may use litigation as their primary means
of achieving political goals, 16 and elected officials will rarely need to initiate litigation. "Party extremists" will embrace this situation with enthusiasm. Party moderates need only use their influence to improve the chances
that federal justices will be willing to resolve those crosscutting issues that
are already before the courts or likely to come before the courts in the near
future. Indeed, legislative deference at times need consist of little more
than refusing to restrain justices already committed to settling a particular
political controversy.
Although elected officials cannot force the Court to resolve issues that
threaten existing partisan alignments, their appeals for judicial policymaking may not fall on deaf ears. Appointed for life, justices do not run the
same political risks that other political actors do when they take strong
stands on highly controversial subjects. Moreover, justices are more willing to declare laws unconstitutional after receiving explicit or implicit
permission from elected officials. If the Court has retreated during periods
of severe legislative hostility to independent judicial policymaking, 1" then
legislative encouragement presumably emboldens the Court. Judges can
be confident that party moderates who have invitedjudicial resolution of
particular issues will not subsequently take steps that might actually reduce
the power or prestige of the Court (although such politicians may grumble
publicly about the substance of decisions or generalized abuses of judicial
power).
15. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 121-162.
16. See, e.g., Richard C. Cortner, "Strategies and Tactics of Litigants in Constitutional
Cases," journal of Public Law 17 (1968): 287. However, as Gerald Rosenberg notes, judicial
victories may prove fairly worthless without the political resources and support necessary to
ensure that favorable judicial decrees are fully implemented. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The
Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991).
17. William Lasser, The Limits of Judicial Power: The Supreme Court in American Politics
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the
Court: A Case Study in the American Political Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
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Mainstream politicians who facilitate judicial policymaking are frequently more interested in having the justices bear the public responsibility for making some policy decision than in the particular policy decision
that the justices might make in response to their legislative invitation, By
holding out the possibility that the judiciary will resolve a disruptive partisan debate, party moderates hope to maintain partisan divisions around
their preferred issues while potential party insurgents rush to the courtroom. If activists who feel strongly about the crosscutting issue become
convinced that the Supreme Court is the governing institution responsible
for settling that controversy, they may continue to vote as they have in the
past on the basis of older issues and inherited partisan attachments, while
concentrating their political activity on efforts to secure favorable judicial
rulings on those matters that most excite them. Needless to say, the more
attention and resources political outsiders invest pursuing judicial solutions, the less opportunity they have to challenge the existing basis of
partisan cleavage. As civil rights activists are learning, energy spent preparing novel legal arguments is not spent registering new voters. 18 Moreover,
while the attention of party extremists is focused on the judiciary, events
may occur that weaken the relative salience of their issues. Technological
improvements may render obsolete some political debate; an economic
recession may return public attention to matters that the two parties are
better structured to debate.
Of course, the eventual judicial decision will rarely, if ever, curtail public
debate on crosscutting issues. Federal justices, after all, have no particular
ability to find compromises that have eluded mainstream politicians.
Those parties aggrieved by the Supreme Court's rulings will condemn
judicial activism (or passivity) and insist that their elected representatives
take steps to discipline an imperial (or insensitive) judiciary. Nevertheless,
even though legislative deference to the judiciary may not reduce the
intensity of public debate over a crosscutting issue in the long run, that
tactic may still diminish the salience of that dispute in electoral politics.
Some persons may be satisfied after receiving a fair hearing by an "impartial" judicial tribunal. Others may continue investing scarce political resources in dubious attempts to have the offending decision overruled.
More significantly, judicial policymaking may create' an additional and
safer position for party moderates to take on politically unpalatable controversies. If the Supreme Court does strike down a federal or state statute,
politicians may respond by engaging in what David Mayhew calls "position-taking," the art of "mak[ing] pleasant judgmental statements" without having to "make pleasant things happen" on highly contested issues. 19
Party moderates appease judicial losers by agreeing with the substance of
legislation declared unconstitutional and by attacking unwarranted judicial
activism, but avoid antagonizing judicial winners by refusing to support
18. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope.
19. David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1974), 62.
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legislation that might limit the judiciary's power to make such policies on
the ground that such measures undermine judicial independence. For
similar reasons, public officials may justify their decision to implement
controversial judicial decisions by pointing to their obligation to obey the
law, while insisting that they disagree with the Court's holding.2o By repeatedly proclaiming that they have no legitimate means of influencing
policy on matters that splinter existing partisan alignments, members of
the dominant political coalitions aspire to persuade citizens that they
should continue voting on the basis of those issues that the major parties
are eager to contest.
Although they fervently pray that the electorate will blame the judiciary
for making controversial policy choices, members of the dominant political
coalition are often less indifferent to judicial output than their public
performances suggest. Rather, mainstream politicians may facilitate judicial policymaking in part because they have good reason to believe that the
courts will announce those policies they privately favor but cannot openly
endorse without endangering their political support. The presidential
wing of the dominant national coalition may support policies that the
legislative wing is not willing or strong enough to enact. Elites in both
parties may prefer policies that their rank and file oppose. In such cases,
the aim of legislative deference to the judiciary is for the courts to make
controversial policies that political elites approve of but cannot publicly
champion, and to do so in such a way that these elites are not held accountable by the general public, or at least not as accountable as they would be
had they personally voted for that policy.
When seeking favorable policy through the judiciary, party moderates
may take steps that evince some policy commitment, but are not likely to
be as well publicized or scrutinized as legislative proposals and policy
votes. Because the electorate rarely pays attention or attaches much significance to judicial appointments or to the activities of the solicitor general, elected officials, in particular the president, can maneuver to obtain
favorable legal decisions without risking the electoral consequences that
might result from sustained legislative efforts to enact the same measures.
Recourse to the courts may, thus, serve as a tacit political compromise
between party moderates in the legislature and policy activists in the White
House. Mainstream legislators who adamantly refuse to disclose their own
feelings on some social controversy may be more willing to confirm judicial
nominees and justice department appointees who are openly committed
to securing a particular legal resolution. When a crosscutting issue divides
the party elite from its mass base, officials of the dominant national coalition may improve their chances of desirable judicial outcomes merely by
appointing to the Supreme Court prestigious jurists who have never indicated what judicial policies they favor. If such justices later elect to make
public policies, the policies they make can be expected to reflect their elite
20. See Walter F. Murphy, and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Publicity, Public Opinion and the
Court," Northwestern University Law Review, 84 (1990): 986-987, 1017.
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status and values. For these reasons, judicial policymaking should normally mirror the beliefs of the presidential2 1 or elite wing of the dominant
national coalition.
Legislative deference to the judiciary offers one additional benefit to
mainstream politicians. A nine-member tribunal that is not politically accountable may be capable of making policy decisions in circumstances when
elected officials, working within complex legislative rules, are too divided
to agree on any particular program. Having a judiciary available to make
policy decisions is a particular boon to elected officials whenever they are
faced with a strong public demand that the government do something
about a pressing problem, but there is no public consensus on a solution.
Citizens aroused by reports of political scandals may be more interested
in having legislators pass a corrupt practices act than in the merits of any
given proposal. In this political environment, politicians best satisfy voters
by passing a bill with an appropriate title that allows the Supreme Court
to decide the precise policy the national government will adopt. Such
actions enable party moderates to take the credit for responding to the
public's concern, while leaving them free to blame the justices for any
weaknesses in the actual policy chosen. Elected officials opposed to the
direction ofjudicial policymaking can always tell their constituents that the
justices misinterpreted the statute they wrote or abused the judicial power
by declaring unconstitutional some part of that measure.22
If this analysis is correct, then judicial review serves vital interests ofboth
the existing dominant national party coalition and the existing national
party system. Federal justices assist the dominant national party coalition
by legitimating their policy agenda and declaring unconstitutional inconsistent state and local practices. Federal justices help maintain the national
party system by removing from the political agenda issues that are disruptive to existing partisan alignments and by resolving those matters in a way
that is consistent with the preferences of elites in both the dominant
majority and minority coalitions. Given the stake party moderates in both
major parties have in foisting crosscutting issues off on the judiciary, the
persons most likely to fight such efforts are not minority-party leaders but
minority-party insurgents. The latter politicians have no investment in the
political status quo. They reject the policies supported by the dominant
national coalition and the policies of the Supreme Court, which reflect elite preferences in both major parties. Moreover, minority-party insurgents wish to
change the existing bases of partisan competition so that future electoral
and legislative political battles will be fought over those issues they feel
most strongly about.
21. David Ada many, "The Supreme Court's Role in Critical Elections," in Bruce A.
Campbell and Richard]. Trilling, eds., Realignment in American Politics (Austin: The University
of Texas Press. 1980), 248.
22. More generally, legislative deference to the judiciary may occur whenever elected
officials agree that the status quo must be changed, but cannot agree on the best method of
change.
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To sum up, the causes of much independent judicial policymaking in the
United States are inherent in the structure of American two-party politics.
Political scientists recognize that "the displacement of conflicts is a prime
instrument of political strategy;"2 3 legislative deference to the judiciary is
simply one tactic that politicians use in their ongoing effort to maintain the
hegemony of their preferred issues. The conflict over conflicts is particularly intense during dealignments, when new political controversies arise
that fracture old partisan divisions.2 4 Such struggles, however, take place
throughout the political cycle. Hence, although judicial policymaking
might be expected to increase immediately before a critical election, the
forces underlying that practice are present in normal politics as well.

CASE STUDIES
The political histories of three prominent instances of independent judicial policymaking illustrate how the phenomenon of legislative deference
to the judiciary often offers better insights into judicial behavior in significant constitutional cases than the model of judicial independence presupposed by the countermajoritarian difficulty. Dred Scott v. Sandford epitomizes political attempts to steer a disruptive partisan fight into safer legal
channels. Rather than take the responsibility for resolving the burning
issue of the 1850s, members of the dominant Democratic party coalition
openly encouraged the Supreme Court to decide when and whether persons could bring slaves into United States territories. The political maneuvering that resulted in the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is an excellent
example of elected officials using legislation as a vehicle for inviting independent judicial policymaking. Party moderates in the late nineteenth
century, unwilling or unable to agree on the extent to which powerful
monopolies should be regulated by the national government, drafted a bill
with exceptionally vague language for the purpose of forcing the Court in
the guise of statutory interpretation to determine the scope of the federal
commerce power. Finally, the recent abortion controversy demonstrates
how legislative deference to the Supreme Court can take place after a
major decision has been handed down. Most contempor~ry politicians did
not overtly encourage the justices to take an interest in sexual and reproductive issues, preferring to leave such matters to the states. Many elected
officials, however, subsequently took steps to ensure that Roe v. Wade
would remain in the courts so that they would not be forced to support
either prolife or prochoice positions in legislative and electoral forums.
In each case study, the justices did not simply "fill the power vacuum"
on their own initiative25 but rather declared laws unconstitutional with the
23. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, 70.
24. Edward G. Carmines, john P. Mciver, andjames A. Stimson, "Unrealized Partisanship: A Theory ofDealignment," Journal of Politics, 49 (1987).
25. Paul Allen Beck, "The Electoral Cycle and Patterns of American Politics," British
Journal of Political Science 9 (1979): 152.
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explicit or implicit permission of prominent members of the dominant
national political coalition. Hence, although the resulting judicial decisions may be questioned on many substantive grounds, the justices cannot
be criticized (or praised) for defeating the will of the legislature; the will
of the legislature in each instance was that the justices take the responsibility for deciding what policy should be the law of the land.
Slavery
Dred Scott v. Sandford is generally regarded as the worst decision ever
handed down by the Supreme Court. ChiefJustice Charles Evans Hughes
described the case as a "self-inflicted wound." Justice Robert Jackson
claimed that by striking down the Missouri Compromise, the Court foreclosed any "hope that American forebearance and statesmanship would
prove equal to finding some compromise between the angry forces that
were being aroused by the slave issue."26 Historians, however, agree that
the politicians most interested in compromise virtually begged the Supreme Court to decide the constitutional status of slavery in the territories.
As Wallace Mendelson notes, the Dred Scott decision "was undertaken only
upon explicit invitation of Congress."27
The Jacksonian party system that dominated American politics from
1824 to 1854 was structured to facilitate debate over internal improvements, not slavery. Indeed, American political parties were originally designed more to exclude slavery from presidential electoral politics than to
foster national debate on any other public controversy.2 8 Both Democratic
and Whig party leaders believed that "national parties and slavery agitation were mutually exclusive."29 Martin Van Buren, the major architect of
that party system, asserted that if the old transectional cleavages between
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans were not revived, destructive
"prejudices between free and slave-holding states [would] inevitably" result. 30
Jacksonian party moderates successfully prevented slavery issues from
dominating national politics until the Mexican War. Democrats and (to a
26. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Foundation, Methods and
Achievements, An Interpretation (New York: Columbia University Press~ 1928), 50; Robert H.
Jackson, The Struggle for judicial Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in American Power Politics (New York:
Vintage Books, 1941), 327. See also, Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 91-100.
27. Wallace Mendelson, "Dred Scott's Case-Reconsidered," Minnesota Law Review, 38
(1953): 16. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 206; David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis
1848-1861 (completed and edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher) (New York: Harper & Row,
1976), 271.
28. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 51; Richard P. McCormick, "Political Development and the Second Party System," in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham,
eds., The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1975), 111-112.
29. John M. McFaul, "Expediency vs. Morality: Jacksonian Politics and Slavery," journal
of American History, 62 (1975): 27.
30. Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959), 131.
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lesser extent) Whigs accepted the Missouri Compromise, which forbade
slavery in all territories north of the 36° 30' parallel line, and the gag rule,
which prevented Congressional debate on the abolition of slavery. The
early Taney Court helped maintain this status quo. Although several justices, Chief Justice Roger Taney in particular, were willing to impose
significant constitutional restraints on legislative power to promote or
restrict slavery, the Court's plurality in the 1830s and 1840s preferred
either to avoid discussing the constitutional status of slavery or to assert
that such issues were for elected officials to decide.3 1
The Mexican War seriously threatened these sectional accommodations.
In 1847, Representative David Wilmot proposed that slavery be excluded
from all territory added to the United States as a result of that conflict, even
though most (though not all) of that land was located below the Missouri
Compromise line. The Wilmot Proviso greatly strengthened those political
movements that wanted national politics to be fought over slavery issues
rather than over internal improvements or the tariff. Antislavery forces in
the North exercised their new-found power in state legislatures by passing
measures endorsing territorial bans on slavery. Energized proslavery
forces in the South insisted that the national government enact new measures that would more vigorously protect the constitutional right to establish their "peculiar institution" in federal territories.
National political leaders, eager to preserve federal silence on sectional
issues, responded to the demands of proslavery and antislavery activists by
advocating both substantive and procedural compromises. Stephen Douglas sought to maintain the unity of the Democratic coalition by raising the
banner of popular sovereignty. This proposal allowed the settlers of each
territory to determine the status of slavery for themselves without federal
interference, and national party moderates would not be forced to vote on
that slavery issue. Moreover, Douglas advocated a policy of national expansion designed in part to reduce the salience of slavery as a political controversy by increasing the territory open for both Southern and Northern
migration.32 In addition to these tactics, other elected officials, both Democratic and Whig, sought to depoliticize sectional conflicts by insisting that
elected officials had no power to settle the status of slavery in the territories. "Slavery," Senator Sam Houston declared, "[is] ,a question not belonging to Congress." 33 Constitutional issues had been raised, he and
others agreed, that could be resolved only by the Supreme Court of the
United States.·
The 1848 report of the Senate select committee on the Territories of
Oregon, California, and New Mexico demonstrated how Congress might
invoke judicial authority to remove divisive sectional issues from electoral
politics. The committee recommended that the federal government refuse
to pass the Wilmot Proviso or other measure which regulated slavery and
31. Groves v. Slaughter 15 Peters 449 (1841); Prigg v. Pennsylvania 16 Peters 539 (1842).
32. Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Issues in the LincolnDouglas Debates (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 48-49.
33. Congressional Globe (Gong. Globe), June 2, 1848, 812.
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instead urged Congress to enact legislation that would facilitate federal
judicial review of any complaint or habeas corpus petition that raised the
constitutional status of human bondage. The federal judiciary would, thus,
become the national institution responsible for choosing between antislavery, proslavery, and popular sovereignty policies. As Senator Clayton, the
author of that compromise, claimed,
this bill resolves the whole question between the North and the South into a
constitutional and a judicial question. It only asks of men of all sections to
stand by the Constitution, and suffer to settle the difference by its own tranquil
operation. If the Constitution settles the question either way, let those who rail
at the decision vent their indignation against their ancestors who adopted it.3 4

Congress soon accepted this invitation to divest itself of the burning question of the day. The bills that made up the compromise of 1850 and the
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 provided that "in all cases involving title to
slaves ... appeals shall be allowed and decided by (the United States)
Supreme Court without regard to the value of the matter." One Senator
observed that Congress had "enacted not a law but a lawsuit." 35
By the time the Dred Scott case was reargued before the Supreme Court
in 1856, party leaders representing all sections of the country had announced that they would accept judicial resolution of the status of slavery
above <!nd below the Missouri Compromise line. Senator Judah Benjamin,
an influential Whig from Louisiana, declared that differences between
North and South would be settled if all parties "agreed that every question
touching human slavery" should be resolved by the federal judiciary. Stephen Douglas claimed that he had always recognized that the status of
slavery was "a judicial question." Even Abraham Lincoln reputedly asserted that "the Supreme Court of the United States is the tribunal to
decide such questions."36
President-elect James Buchanan had long hoped to keep slavery out
of national debate. He told his followers that the "great object of [his] administration would be to arrest ... the agitation of the slavery question ... and to destroy sectional parties." His inaugural address declared
that the status of slavery in the territories was "a judicial question, which
legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States." Buchanan added that like "all good citizens," he would "cheerfully submit"
to that decision_37 Historians have demonstrated that shortly before he
34. Cong. Globe, July 18, 1848, 950.
35. 9 Statutes at Large 450, 455-456; I 0 Statutes at Large 280, 287; Potter, The Impending
Crisis, 27 I.
36. Cong. Globe, May 2, 1856, 1093; Appendix, Cong. Globe, June 2, 1856, 796; Abraham
Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. II, Roy B. Basler, ed. (New Brunswick, Nj:
Rutgers University Press, 1953), 355. (Fehrenbacher disputes the authenticity of the last
statement. Fehrenbacher, The DTed Scott Case, 645 n.39.)
37. Lawson Alan Pendleton,James Buchanan's Attitude TowaTd Slavery (Ann Arbor: Universal Microfilms International, I 964), 275;James Buchanan, "Inaugural Address," in James D.
Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. VI! (New York:
Bureau of National Literature, 1897), 2962.
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took the oath of office, Buchanan learned that the Court would declare the
Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, and he had urged at least one
Northern justice to sign the majority opinion so that the decision would
appear to have broad national support.38 Nevertheless, contrary to some
speculation, Buchanan's inaugural address did not ask the country to accept his interpretation of the Constitution. Throughout his career, Buchanan had frequently stated that the Missouri Compromise was "entirely
constitutional,"39 but he also consistently asserted that the question "can
only be settled finally by the Supreme Court." In letters to friends and
political allies, Buchanan commented that, as a party moderate, he would
willingly abandon the Missouri Compromise in the interest of sectional
harmony. 40 In short, Buchanan called for public acceptance of the Dred
Scott decision because he was more committed to removing slavery from
partisan debate than to any particular settlement of the issue.
Several justices in the Dred Scott majority declared that these same political pressures led them to consider the constitutionality of the Missouri
Compromise (as Justice Nelson's opinion pointed out, the case could have
been resolved on politically safer choice oflaw grounds). Justice Wayne's
concurrence asserted that "the peace and harmony of the country required
the settlement" of the status of slavery in the territories "by judicial decision."41 Although such assertions should, perhaps, be taken with a grain
of salt, members of the Dred Scott majority later refrained from independent policymaking when the political climate became inhospitable to such
endeavors. Taney, for example, never found a suitable occasion during the
rest of his years for making public an opinion he had drafted declaring the
Civil War unconstitutional along with such Civil War measures as the draft
and the Emancipation Proclamation. 42
This brief political history demonstrates that the Taney Court did not
thwart political efforts to find a compromise on slavery that would have
maintained the basis of partisan cleavage in the Second American party
system. Rather, in deciding Dred Scott, the Court was carrying out the
wishes of Jacksonian moderates who desperately hoped that persons aggrieved by whatever decision the justices eventually made might nevertheless be more disposed to accept constitutional principles announced by a
"neutral" judiciary than public policies enacted by elected officials. In fact,
the Compromise of 1850 was not an absolute failure. The legislative decision to invite judicial policymaking enabled the majority Democratic coalition to run successfully as a national party in 1852 and 1856. During this
time, a more durable compromise might have been forged or such outside
events as a foreign war could have mitigated the impact that slavery had
38. Philip Auchampaugh, 'James Buchanan, the Court, and the Dred Scott Case," Tennessee History Magazine 9 (1929).
39. Pendleton, James Buchanan's Attitude, 112 n.7, 70-72, 94-95, 118-120, 141.

40. Ibid., 283, 131-131, 362-363.
41. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 493.
42. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, 553-555, 574-575.
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on political allegiances. Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision that slavery was unconstitutional in the territories did not precipitate the destruction of either Jacksonian political coalition. The Kansas-Nebraska Act of
1854 had already finished the Whigs. The Democrats broke up over
"bleeding Kansas" and the Lecompton Constitution in 1857 and 1858.43
Significantly, critics of Dred Scott never point to any alternative maneuver
or compromise that would have successfully removed slavery from electoral politics in the 1850s.
Dred Scott is best understood as a failed effort to resuscitate Jacksonian
politics rather than as a cause of its death. On the other hand, the attempt
by party moderates to salvage existing partisan alignments by removing
slavery issues to the judiciary was clearly futile. Too many Northerners
proved no more willing to tolerate proslavery constitutionalism when articulated by ChiefJustice Roger Taney and the Supreme Court than when
dictated by Senator John C. Calhoun and the Congress of the United
States. In the hands of Abraham Lincoln and other Republicans, Dred Scott
merely became one more weapon that could be wielded to annihilate
Jacksonian party politics.

Antitrust
United States v. E. C. Knight is another commonly cited example of alleged
judicial usurpation. Justice John Marshall Harlan was only the first of many
critics who charged that the Court "defeated the main object" of the
Sherman Antitrust Act by holding that Congress had not and could not
have intended to regulate monopolies engaged solely in the production of
goods. 44 Five years earlier, however, Senator Orville Platt had accused his
colleagues of ignoring "the question of whether a bill would be operative,
of how it would be operative, of how it would operate, or whether it was
within the power of Congress to enact it." In his eyes, and in the eyes of
many historians, the Fifty-first Congress intended only "to get some bill
headed 'a bill to punish trusts' with which to go to the country." 45 The
43. On the breakup of the Whigs, see William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion:
Secessionists at Bay 1776-1854 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 550-562. On the
breakup of the Democrats, see Kenneth M. Stampp, Amenca in 1857: A Na1ion on the Brink (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
44. United States v. E. C. Knight 156 U.S. 1, 42 (1895) (Harlan,]., dissenting). E. C. Knight
must be read as an instance of statutory interpretation and constitutional decision-making.
Chief Justice Fuller's majority opinion held that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not license
federal prosecution of the sugar trust because Congress "did not attempt ... to assert the
power to deal with monopoly directly." Fuller reached this conclusion, however, solely
because he believed that a broader interpretation of the Sherman act would have required
the justices to declare that measure unconstitutional. Thus, the bulk of the E. C. Knight
opinion purports to demonstrate that the "constitutional power to regulate commerce ... is
a power independent of the power to suppress monopoly." "It was in the light of [this]
well-settled principle[]," Fuller asserted, "that the act of July 2, 1890, was framed." E. C.
Knight, at 16, 12, 16.Justice Harlan also thought that the E. C. Knight opinion rested on the
Court's interpretation of the commerce power. E. C. Knight, at 22 (Harlan,]., dissenting). For
more on the case of U.S. v E. C. Knight see, e.g., McCloskey, The American Supreme Court, 127.
45. Congressional Record (Cong. Rec.) (March 27, 1890): 2731. See Hans Birger Thorelli,
The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
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"main object" of the Sherman act, scholars agree, was to enable Congress
to defer to whatever antitrust policy that the federal courts decided to
make.
Skowronek describes post-Civil War America as "the triumph of the
state of courts and parties." Political parties distributed the spoils of government; courts made the substantive rules. 46 Political power in this regime was based on the control of patronage rather than on the ability to
articulate attractive visions of the American polity. Party identification
typically reflected personal or familial experiences during the Civil War,
rather than the conflicts generated by the emerging industrial order. Although that order increasingly divided Americans sectionally and occupationally, the Third American party system never incorporated these new
cleavages. Established politicians successfully waved "the bloody shirt"
whenever crosscutting economic issues threatened to disrupt existing political alignments. 47
In the years immediately after the Civil War and Reconstruction, national leaders ignored repeated demands for federal economic policy.
Scattered individual political entrepreneurs did propose various regulatory measures, but neither major party was willing or able to develop a
comprehensive industrial program. Nevertheless, by the late 1880s, mainstream Republican and Democratic politicians had realized the economic
and political necessity of some centralized effort to curb the power of trusts
and monopolies. Industrial, agricultural, and mercantile interests all called
for some form of federal regulation. Economic issues became increasingly
salient in local elections and third parties running on specific commercial
platforms were gaining strength.48
National political leaders responded to these pressures in part by expanding federal judicial power over interstate commerce. Legislators
sponsored measures that proclaimed the existence of federal industrial
policy but which did not clearly describe the nature of that policy. Although, as was the case with the Interstate Commerce Act, administrative
agencies were sometimes given the first opportunity to translate vague
statutory commands into public policy, Congress vested final policymaking
power in the federal bench. Political leaders hoped that courts would
develop a national regulatory program while ostensibly-engaging in statutory interpretation.
The Sherman Antitrust Act was the most prominent legislative attempt
to increase judicial policymaking power.John Sherman advertised his proposals as declaring no new principles of law. Their purpose, he declared,

1954}, 229; Donald Grant Morgan, Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), 142; William Letwin, Law and
Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Anti- Trust Act (New York: Random House,
1965}, 54.
.
46. Skowronek, Building a New American State, 24-31, 39-42.
4 7. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 108, 123; Wallace Mendelson, "The Politics
of Judicial Activism," Emory Law journal 24 (1975): 49.
48. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 120-133.
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was merely to "appl[y] old and well-recognized principles of the common
law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Government."
Sherman recognized that American common law did not draw a "precise
line between lawful and unlawful combinations." Rather than provide
more specific guidelines, however, Sherman and other senators insisted
that such a task "must be left open for the courts to determine in each
particular case." 4 9 Thus, judges would inevitably have to make antitrust
policy when "interpreting" just what commercial activity was prohibited by
the proposed enactment.
Senators debating the Sherman act were mindful of the specific problems that antitrust prosecution of the E. C. Knight Company might present.
Nevertheless, they refused to write a bill that would clearly indicate
whether (or which of) that monopoly's practices were illegal. In early
legislative debates, Sherman argued that Congress possessed the power to
regulate any manufacturer whose monopolistic practices affected prices on
the interstate market. He specifically mentioned the E.C. Knight ~ugar
refining trust as an example of a monopoly that his bill would prohibit. 5°
Opponents of the original antitrust bill declared that the Constitution did
not permit Congress to regulate firms that only engaged in in-state production, even if their goods were later shipped out of state by third parties.
Senator George Edmunds explicitly pointed to the sugar trust as an example of a monopoly that could not be regulated by a constitutional antitrust
bill. 51 Unable to resolve the debate, but committed to passing antitrust
regulations, the Senate referred the constitutional question to its judiciary
committee. Five days later, the committee returned with a rewritten version of Sherman's proposal. The new bill declared unlawful "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of commerce among the several States.'' The meaning of "restraint of commerce among the several States" was never explained, and
no senator discussed whether the sugar trust could be lawfully prosecuted
if the amended statute were enacted. Instead, Senator Edmunds, the chair
of the committee, declared that the bill "would leave it to the courts in the
first instance to say how far they could carry it. "52 Remarkably, debate over
the constitutional scope of congressional power ceased, ~nd what had been
a highly controversial bill passed with only one dissenting vote.
Legislators in the House debate (which lasted less than a day) similarly
approved the discretionary power that the Sherman act vested in the
courts. The floor leader for the bill, Representative D.B. Culbertson,
clearly recognized that the Sherman act, like the compromise of 1850, was
better described as a potential lawsuit than as a law. 'Just what contracts,
what combinations in the form of trusts, or what conspiracies will be in
restraint of trade or commerce mentioned in the bill," he informed his
49.
50.
51.
52.
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colleagues, "will not be known until the courts have construed and interpreted this provision." When a skeptical representative asked him to describe a specific practice that would be considered illegal should the statute
be passed, Culbertson responded that he "did not know, nor can any man
know, just what contracts will be embraced by this section of the bill until
the courts decide. "53
The subsequent history of E. C. Knight belies one common distinction
between statutory interpretation and constitutional decision-making. In
theory, the former use of judicial power is more flexible and democratic
than the latter. Ordinary legislative majorities, the conventional wisdom
goes, are free to pass more specific statutes when they are dissatisfied with
judicial interpretations of existing law; an exercise of judicial review, however, can be overturned only -by the supermajority necessary to pass a
constitutional amendment. In practice, the difference between these two
forms ofjudicial policymaking is not as clear cut. Scholars have shown that
efforts to amend statutes in light of judicial decisions have historically
proven more difficult than efforts to pass the original proposal.5 4 Moreover, when elected officials wish to resume their responsibility for resolving issues on which they formerly had sought to invite judicial policymaking, the justices often distinguish or abandon previous constitutional
rulings that might otherwise inhibit the present lawmaking majority. When
in the wake of the critical election of 1896 the executive branch began to
enforce a more coherent antitrust policy, the Supreme Court responded
by consistently finding that federal prosecutions were within the commerce
power, even in factual situations very similar to E. C. Knight. 55 When Americans overwhelmingly voted to support national industrial policy in 1936,
the justices responded by abandoning E.G. Knight completely.

Abortion
Roe v. Wade is the contemporary case most often compared to Dred Scott
v. Sandford. Opponents of that decision claim that the Burger Court should
have respected state decisions regulating abortion in local communities,
just as the Taney Court should have respected federal decisions regulating
slavery in American territories.56 Social science research, however, suggests a different parallel between the two cases. Like slavery, abortion may
be "the kind of 'bullet' issue that legislators have avoided when possible."
Joni Lovenduski (:l.ndJoyce Outshoorn observe that mainstream politicians
in virtually every Western democracy responded to the emergence of the
abortion issue by adopting strategies which emphasize "abstinence, post53. Gong. Rec. (May I, 1890): 4089.
54. Beth Henshen, "Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional
Responses," American Politics Quarterly II (1983); Harry P. Stumpf, American judicial Politics
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 417.
55. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States 175 U.S. Ill (1899); Northern Securities Co. v.
United States 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
56. See, e.g., Charles E. Rice, "The Dred Scot Case of the Twentieth Century," Houston
Law Review, 10 (1973).
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ponement, and depoliticization." Judicial review, Alvin Cohan suggests, is
merely the particular device that American public officials have used to
remove this politically unpalatable issue from electoral debate.5 7 Just as
national party leaders did in the 1850s, contemporary political leaders
encouraged judicial resolution of an issue that threatened existing partisan
alignments.
Abortion is admittedly a more complex and substantially different instance of legislative deference to the judiciary than either slavery or antitrust. Owing perhaps to advances in communication technologies that
enable citizens to learn what their representatives say in Congress merely
by watching the evening news or reading the morning paper, politicians
no longer openly admit that they would rather see the judiciary resolve
highly contested public policy issues. Instead, party moderates feign great
interest in controversies that they secretly wish would disappear. Politicians most often express their actual reservations about having to make
public choices about abortion in off-the-record or unattributable remarks
to journalists and scholars. Maris Vinovskis's investigation of abortion
politics in the House of Representatives, for example, found that "attempts to pass a constitutional amendment to prohibit all abortions have
become annual events that most members of Congress privately dread but
publicly welcome. "58
Unlike slavery and antitrust, abortion became a significant threat to the
established party system only after the Supreme Court had engaged in
independent judicial policymaking. National party moderates did not invite courts to start making abortion policy. Rather, most simply ignored
the issue and hoped judges would do likewise. Nevertheless, many elected
officials responded to Roe by quietly taking steps to ensure that courts,
rather than legislatures, would continue to be the forums responsible for
resolving debates over whether the law should permit women to terminate
their pregnancies. For this reason, the most interesting instances oflegislative deference to the judiciary in recent years occurred after the Supreme
Court announced that abortion was a constitutional right.
Struggles over economic issues dominated American party politics in the
middle of the twentieth century. Democrats generally favored public welfare spending; Republicans urged less interference with private market
forces. By the end of the 1960s, however, the party system that had dominated political life since the 1930s was rapidly decomposing.59 Although
57. Eva R. Rubin, Abortion, Politics, and the Courts: Roe v. Wade and its Aftermath, revised ed.,
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 84;Joni Lovenduski andjoyce Outshoorn, "Introduction: The New Politics of Abortion," injoni Lovenduski and joyce Outshoorn, eds., The New
Politics of Abortion (London: Sage Publications, 1986), 1-2; Cohan, "Abortion as a Marginal
Issue."
58. Maris A. Vinovskis, "Abortion and the Presidential Election of 1976: A Multivariate
Analysis of Voting Behavior," in Carl E. Schneider and Maris A. Vinovskis, eds., The Law and
Politics of Abortion (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980), 224.
59. Walter Dean Burnham, The Current Crisis in American Politics (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982); Walter Dean Burnham, "American Politics in the 1970's: Beyond
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the two major parties were still divided over the legacy of the New Deal,
albeit in a "compressed" fashion, 5° voters were becoming more concerned
with such issues as law and order, race, and sociallifestyles.6 1 The dominant Democratic party was torn between liberals who were attracted to new
understandings of gender roles and sexual practices, and traditionalists
who were repelled by such attitudes. (The Republican party was also internally divided over those issues, but to a lesser degree, at least initially). 62
These developments did not please leading officials in both major parties
who had made their reputations fighting for and against new social entitlements. Traditional Democrats and Republicans continued to dispute the
extent to which government should regulate economic activity (at least at
the margins), but many mainstream politicians wanted to avoid those social
issues that threatened to transform the party system to their detriment.
Abortion and birth control were successfully organized out of American
electoral politics from the 1930s until the 1970s. With most politicians
unwilling to take strong public stands on whether women had a right to
terminate their pregnancies, proponents of statutory reform lacked the
power to repeal existing restrictions, and proponents of those restrictions
lacked the power to have them enforced. 63 The result was that contraception and abortion were both illegal and widely tolerated. The Supreme
Court accepted this status quo in Poe v. ,Ullman6 4 by dismissing a constitutional attack on Connecticut's birth control regulations on the ground that
there was no substantial threat that the state would actually prosecute
contraceptive users.
When debate over these social issues intensified during the sixties, some
elected officials began to look to the judiciary for relief. Thomas Emerson,
the noted civil libertarian then representing advocates of contraception
and abortion rights, sensed that many politicians "preferred to have the
Court, rather than themselves, make the decision to eliminate" statutory
restrictions. State attorneys helped Planned Parenthood design and stage
a test case on birth control rights that judges could not easily dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds. 55 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court in Griswold
v. Connecticut 56 held that states could not regulate the use of contraception,
'
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61. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 352-412.
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a decision that apparently inspired hope among governmental officials that
the justices might also be willing to make abortion policy. Two studies of
abortion politics indicate that by the end of the sixties, politicians in many
states were eager to have the judiciary remove that divisive issue from
electoral politics. Even opponents of the constitutional right of privacy
recognized that most elected officials were privately pleased when in 1973
the Supreme Court struck down all significant state restrictions on abortion. John Hart Ely, for example, concludes his scathing attack on Roe by
noting "the sighs of relief as this particular albatross was cut from the
legislative and executive necks. "67
In the aftermath of Roe v. Wade, many politicians who had previously
ignored the abortion controversy joined the struggle to keep the debate
over privacy rights in the courtroom and out of electoral politics. Although
most national officials in the seventies and eighties expressed qualms
about abortion on demand, enough uncommitted legislators voted with
prochoice representatives to prevent Congress from enacting statutes or
proposing constitutional amendments that would deny women the right to
terminate their pregnancies. Late-twentieth-century politicians proved
particularly successful when fighting against proposals that would strip the
Supreme Court and lower federal tribunals of the jurisdiction necessary to
make abortion policy. Pro life efforts to divest the national judiciary of its
power to adjudicate abortion issues never received any substantial support
in either the House of Representatives or the Senate. Even William French
Smith, President Ronald Reagan's first attorney general, publicly criticized
proposals that would limit federal jurisdiction over abortion. 68
More generally, Congress avoided creating the sort of legislative record
to which courts might intelligently defer. House and Senate debate on
abortion was unusually truncated, and most issues were tabled rather than
voted on.69 Although prolife representatives introduced hundreds of constitutional amendments in the years following Roe v. Wade, only one of
them was reported out of committee. Significantly, that proposal, the
Hatch Amendment, would neither criminalize nor legalize abortion, but
merely require that state legislatures decide when women could lawfully
terminate their pregnancies. Thus, "without actually moving to outlaw
abortion," Frederickjaffe and associates note, national""'legislators could
67. Rubin. Abortion, 84-85; Lawrence M. Friedman, "The Conflict Over Constitutional
Legitimacy," in Gilbert Y. Steiner, ed., The Abortion Dispute and the American System (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 2I;John Hart Ely, "The Wages of Crying Wolf:
A Comment on Roe v. Wade," Yale Law journal 82 (1973): 947.
68. Gerald Gunther, "Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate," Stanford Law Review 36 (1984): 902; Lasser, The
Limits ojJudicial Power, 238, 241.
69. Roger H. Davidson, "Procedures and Politics in Congress," in Gilbert Y. Steiner, ed.,
The Abortion Dispute and the American System (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1983), 45-46; Vinovskis, "Abortion and the Presidential Election," 226, 229; Rubin, Abortion,
91-92; Bob Packwood, "The Rise and Fall of the Right-To-Life Movement in Congress:
Responses to the Roe Decision, 1973-83," in]. Douglas Butler and David F. Walbert, eds.,
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demonstrate their concern about it, while at the same time disposing of this
troublesome issue by throwing it back to the states." 70
Politicians frequently refused to serve on legislative committees whose
jurisdictions might force them to take up privacy rights. Dan Quayle, for
example, avoided the judiciary Committee when first elected to the Senate.
"They [were] going to be dealing with all those issues like abortion," he
told an interviewer, and Quayle "want[ed] to stay as far away from them"
as he could. 71 Even congressional committees whose responsibilities
touched on abortion did their best to avoid that controversy. Members of
a House Select Committee on the Population of the United States charged
with considering such subjects as contraception and teenage pregnancy
informed the experts testifying before them that witnesses would not be
permitted to discuss abortion and would be silenced if they did so at any
length.72
The only abortion issue that Congress consistently considered at length
in the years following Roe was whether Medicaid funds could be used to
pay for abortions. This issue tied abortion questions to those social welfare
issues that have divided the national parties since the New Deal. Hence,
mainstream politicians, particularly those in the Republican party, were
able to point to their general opposition to governmental welfare spending
when explaining their willingness to deny financing to indigents seeking
abortion. Significantly, some prochoice members defended their decision
to support the appropriations measure to which the Hyde Amendment was
attached by expressing their certainty that the judiciary would reinstate
Medicaid funding for abortions. Senator Birch Bayh announced that he
was voting for the omnibus bill because many of its features were desirable
and he was "confident that any court ruling will hold [the abortion provision] unconstitutionaJ."73
Abortion debate has always been more intense in state legislatures than
in Congress. Even before Roe, prochoice forces in some communities were
strong enough to repeal all restrictions on abortion. Prolife forces in
others were strong enough to pass measures immediately after Roe renewing their state's commitment to regulating abortion. 74 Local officials can
frequently take firmer stands on reproductive rights because their smaller
70. Frederick S. Jaffe, Barbara Lindheim, and Philip R. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private
Morality and Public Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), 115.
71. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Making ofa Senator: Dan Quayle (Washington, DC: CQPress,
1989) 20; Michael C. Munger, "Allocation of Desirable Committee Assignments: Extended
Queues versus Committee Expansion," American journal of Political Science 32 ( 1988): 335.
President Bush apparently shares this concern. See Fred Barnes, "White House Watch:
Prenant Silence," The New Republic 205 (August 19 & 26, 1991): 12.
72. Henry P. David, "The Abortion Decision: National and International Perspectives,"
in James Tunstead Burtchaell, ed., Abortion Parley (Kansas City: Andrews and McMell,
1980), 59.
73. John T. Noonan,Jr., A Private Choice: Abortion in America in the Seventies (New York: The
Free Press, 1979), 107. See Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope, 339-340.
74. For a good summary of legislative activity in the years following Roe, see Glen
Halva-Neubauer, "Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age," Publius 20 (1990): 32-34.
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constituencies share their political preferences. Persons seeking political
office in urban college towns safely advocate abortion on demand; candidates wishing to represent poorer, rural districts take few electoral risks
when they condemn such policies.
Nevertheless, several studies suggest that most local officials are not
eager to take full responsibility for making abortion policies. One state
legislator described the Ohio House of Representatives as consisting of
"ten strong pro-choice people, ten strong pro-life, and 79 legislators who
would rather the issue would go away." Another local representative commented that "none of us but the fringe players [advocates] want to vote
on this." A survey of Minnesota legislators found that only ten percent
thought abortion policy should be made in the states. More than half of
the representatives surveyed stated that abortion should either not be a
public policy issue or that the federal judiciary should resolve the matter.
Indeed, a Minnesota state legislator who sought to force a floor vote on
abortion was threatened with loss of district benefits by other representatives not eager to take public stands on that issue. 7 5
Local officials who publicly identify with either the prolife or prochoice
movements frequently seem uninterested in the policy consequences of
those restrictions on abortion being debated in their state legislatures.
Many socially conservative representatives support tough bans on abortion
that please prolife activists, but they spend little energy constructing policies that might satisfy constitutional standards. Eva Rubin observes that
these legislators "often seemed little concerned with the constitutionality
of their product and passed the buck with alacrity to the courts." 76 Because
from 1973 to 1989 the Supreme Court generally declared restrictive abortion policies unconstitutional, proponents of abortion rights did not waste
precious political resources fighting such measures in the state legislature.
Indeed, some prochoice activists asked socially liberal representatives to
eschew efforts to moderate severe restrictions on abortion because the
revised legislation might better withstand constitutional challenge in federal courts. 77
For fifteen years, this implicit compromise served the electoral needs of
most public officials. Many persons opposed to abortion did not blame
their state representatives for not implementing restriCtions on abortion
because they perceived that the courts were the institution responsible for
making prochoice decisions. Many persons who favored abortion rights
75. Patricia Bayer Richard, "They'd Rather It Would Go Away: Ohio Legislators and
Abortion Policy," paper presented at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 18-20, 1991: 7-8;Janna C. Merick and Stephen I.
Frank, "Single-Issue Politics: The Case of Abortion in Minnesota," paper presented at the
Midwest Political Science Association Convention, Chicago, IL, April 24-26, 1980; Raymond
Tatalovich, and Bryon W. Daynes, The Politics of Abortion: A Study of Community Conflict in Public
Policy Making (New York: Praeger 1981), 202-203, 216 n.172; Glen Halva-Neubauer, "Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age: The Case of Minnesota," paper delivered at the Midwest
Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago, IL, April 18-20, 1991: 41.
76. Rubin, Abortion, 130-131.
77. Debra W. Stewart, and jeanne Bell Nicholson, "Abortion Policy in 1978," Pub/ius 9
(1979): 165.
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did not blame their elected officials for passing prolife legislation because
they believed they could trust the judiciary to protect those rights. Politicians who did not wish to be clearly identified as being prochoice or prolife
could make pointed comments about the Roe decision that avoided clearly
stating their position on the underlying abortion issue. 7 8 Thus, although
Roe clearly disrupted normal politics at first, legislative efforts to keep
abortion in the courts minimized the damage. Rubin points out that as a
result of continued judicial policymaking, the abortion conflict was
"tamed, limited, and confined by the ritual dance, back and forth, between
legislatures and courts. "79
In the 1980s, prolife forces did succeed in dominating one national
political institution, the presidency. Republican candidates who campaigned against Roe won three consecutive presidential landslides, so while
in the White House, President Reagan and (to a lesser extent) President
Bush announced their hostility to abortion, occasionally proposed legislation restricting access to abortion and appointed movement "profamily"
conservatives to visible domestic policymaking positions. Prolife activists
were particularly pleased when President Bush interpreted federal regulations as forbidding governmental assistance to any program that even
mentioned abortion as a reproductive choice.
Nevertheless, Republican executives hostile to abortion had significant
difficulty convincing mainstream legislators to challenge judicial decisions
legalizing prochoice policies. In retrospect, the Reagan/Bush administration was apparently far less committed to making abortion policy than
many of its public statements indicated. The successful enactment of Reagan's massive tax and domestic spending cuts suggests that his failure to
obtain legislation undermining Roe cannot be attributed to any general
weakness in the governing majority that dominated American politics from
1980 to 1982. Rather, in order to preserve the united coalition necessary
to sustain their attack on the welfare state, President Reagan and his
associates deliberately chose to deemphasize legislation and constitutional
amendments that might expose and exacerbate internal divisions within
the Republican party (and among Democratic "boll weevils") over abortion. As James Sundquist observes, "in order to get on with his pressing
economic agenda," the president "had to avoid, postpoi;te, and subordinate divisive conflicts over the social and moral measures of the New
Right."Sl
President Reagan did attempt to overturn Roe by placing many socially
conservative justices on the federal bench,82 a strategy that was fairly
78. Rubin, Abortion, 95-98.
79. Rubin, Abortion, 145.
. 80. Though studies suggest that abortion had very little to do with those electoral
tnumphs. Vinovskis, "Abortion and the Presidential Election," 200-201; Donald Granberg,
"The Abortion Issue in the 1984 Election," Family Planning Perspectives 19 (1987): 59-61.
81. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 442. See Lasser, The Limits of judicial Power,
219; Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope, 185; Davidson "Procedures and Politics in Congress," 35.
82. David M. O'Brien, "The Reagan judges: His Most Enduring Legacy?" in Charles 0.
Jones, ed., The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988);
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successful during the first six years of his presidency. Many Senators who
were unwilling to take a strong open stand against abortion proved willing
to confirm Reagan's judicial nominees because their votes were either not
publicized or not interpreted as policy decisions on abortion.B3 The Reagan administration's attempt to place Judge Robert Bork on the Supreme
Court, however, proved an exception to this rule. The Senate quashed that
nomination, in part, because prochoice activists were able to convince the
public that a vote for Bork was a vote to overturn Roe v. Wade. Nevertheless, senators quickly demonstrated that their rejection of Bork could not
be understood as signifying their approval of constitutional abortion
rights. The nextjustice approved by the Senate, Judge Anthony Kennedy,
never stated that he favored any specific reproductive liberty, but talked
vaguely of recognizing some freedoms that were not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution. While a senator voting for Bork voted to overrule Roe,
a senator voting for Judge Kennedy voted to leave that decision to the
nominee. By rejecting Bork and unanimously confirming Kennedy, the
Senate, in effect, voted fifty-eight to forty-two to keep abortion out of
electoral politics.
Judicial rulings hostile to abortion rights did not prove to be beneficial
overall for the GOP. Indeed, in the wake of Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 84 many Republican elites made renewed efforts to find some safe
way of removing abortion from national politics. In a manner reminiscent
of the Democrats in 1856, prominent national Republican officials now
declared that their party had no position on abortion (other than, perhaps,
popular sovereignty) and proclaimed the wish to campaign on the party's
traditional economic positions. Responding to increased prochoice sentiment in the public and within the GOP, Lee Atwater and other leaders of
the Republican party announced that their coalition was a "big tent" under
which proponents and opponents of abortion on demand were both welcome.85 President Bush professed not to know or care what his judicial
nominees, Judges David Souter and Clarence Thomas, thought about
abortion. Many Democrats, meanwhile, like the Whig/Republicans in
1856, seemed more interested in emphasizing their position on abortion
(cf. slavery) than in calling for the kind of state-sponsored welfare programs that have previously united their political coalition. The Democratically controlled Senate Judiciary Committee, for example, focused much
of its energy elucidating Judge Souter's and Judge Thomas's position on
Walter F. Murphy, "Reagan's Judicial Strategy," in Larry Berman, ed., Looking Back on
the Reagan Presidenc~ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Rubin, Abortion,
178-179.
83. O'Brien, "The Reagan Judges," 71.
84. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
85. Robin Toner, "Room in G.O.P. for Abortion Rights, Quayle Says," The New York
Times (national edition) 141 (October 9, 1991 ): A9 (Vice President Quayle endorses the "big
tent"); Debra L. Dodson and Lauren D. Burnbauer, Election 1989: The Abortion Issue in New
jersey and I'irgima (Nj: Eagleton Institute of Politics 1990), 85; Halva-Neubauer. "Abortion
Policy," 42.
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abortion, and rarely exhibited concern about how those jurists might rule
on the legal and constitutional rights of labor unions or the poor.86

THE PERSISTENCE AND TACTICS OF LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE
A brief survey of American history indicates that these three case studies
hardly exhaust historical instances oflegislative deference to the judiciary.
Case studies of specific Supreme Court decisions and litigation campaigns
routinely acknowledge that mainstream politicians relied on a wide variety
of overt or subtle devices to encourage or facilitate judicial declarations
that significant federal or state policies were unconstitutional. In his account of Fletcher v. Peck, 87 C. Peter Magrath notes that "at all times the
claimants had the covert support of the Jefferson administration and
strong support within Congress." Gerald G. Eggert demonstrates that
lawyers in President Cleveland's justice department consciously adopted
strategies that strengthened the constitutional case against the income
tax. 88 Likewise, when confronted with complex crosscutting issues, elected
officials have frequently insisted that these policy decisions should be
made by the federal judiciary. Republican party moderates in 1865 and
1866 decided to let the Supreme Court determine the scope of federal
power under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.89 In 1904, the
House Committee on Elections stated that Congress should not determine
whether a disputed South Carolina election had violated the Fifteenth
Amendment, but that the Supreme Court was the "proper forum for the
decision of constitutional and other judicial questions."90 Further examples fill out the story of Congress considering and enacting legislation that
purposely failed to answer relevant constitutional questions. In the late
nineteenth century, Senator Lindsay, attempting to resolve a policy dispute between the eastern and western wings of the Democratic party over
the income tax of 1894 refused, along with other party moderates, to
accept amendments that would have specified what earnings were subject
to the statutory levy. Lindsay maintained that "it is better to let the courts
settle this question than by attempting to enumerate fail to include the
whole scope of constitutional limitation. "9 1 During the legislative debates
'
86. Dodson and Burnbauer suggest that Democrats are now able to present a fairly
unified front on abortion because "pro-life voters who care passionately about the issue have
already defected to the Republican party." Dodson and Burnbauer, Election 1989, 86.
87. 6 Cranch 87 (!810).
88. C. Peter Magrath, Yazoo: Law and Politics in the New Republic: The Cases of Fletcher v. Peck
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1966), 58; Gerald G. Eggert, "Richard Olney and the Income Tax
Cases," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (1961): 26.
89. Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and Congress, 1863-1869 (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1990), 69. The judiciary was never given the opportunity to make
civil rights policy because President johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Congressional proponents of civil rights, fortified by the election of 1866, responded by passing the
Fourteenth Amendment.
90. House Report No. 1740, 58th Cong., 2d sess., 1904, p. 3.
91. Gong. Rec. (June 26, 1894): 6814.
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on Civil War loyalty oaths and the income tax, many representatives
agreed that Congress should not consider the constitutional merits of
proposed measures because that was the responsibility of the federal judiciary. Those representatives who did offer constitutional commentaries
limited their analyses to predictions of what the justices would, in fact,
do.92
Public officials have frequently asserted that they were forced by circumstances either to vote for or to sign legislation containing clauses they
believed were unwise or unconstitutional. Before the Supreme Court outlawed the practice in INS v. Chadha, 93 presidents repeatedly complained
that they had been obliged to accept unconstitutional legislative vetoes as
the price for obtaining the powers they believed necessary to administer
the government.9 4 Many leading Democrats publicly opposed the income
tax of 1894 on policy and constitutional grounds but voted for the measure
because the hated provision was attached to the Wilson-Gorman tariff.95
Members of the early nineteenth-century New York legislature openly
declared that they wished to repeal the steamship monopoly at issue in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 96 but they feared that the Supreme Court would find that
such legislation violated the contracts clause. 97
Party moderates have solicited judicial policymaking by expanding federal jurisdiction. Lasser points out that the Test Oath Cases 98 and Ex Parte
Milligan 9 9 were handed down shortly after the Reconstruction Congress
passed legislation that facilitated judicial review of civil liberties issues.
When the Court proceeded to make decisions legislators disapproved of,
that jurisdictional grant was promptly repealed and the Court immediately
adopted a more passive attitude toward congressional policies. 100 Statutory provisions expediting judicial review of controversial issues have also
served as important legislative compromises. Congress in the 1970s and
1980s was under great pressure to pass laws reforming campaign finance
and reducing the deficit, but representatives could not agree on any specific response to these public demands. Both the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1974 and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act were enacted
after extended debate only when legislators opposed to several provisions
in each bill were induced to support their passage by the addition of
92. Morgan, Congress and the Constitution, 122-39, 154, 156.
93. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
94. Barbara Hinkson Craig, Chadha: The Story of an Epic Constitutional Struggle (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1988); James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), 345-354.
95. Cong, Rec., June 27, 1894, 6611, 6894; Edward Stanwood, American Tarif! Controverszes in the Nineteenth Century, val. II (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1903), 326, 338, 343, 354.
96. 22 U.S. I (1824).
97. Wallace Mendelson, "New Light on Fletcher v. Peck and Gibbons v. Ogden, .. Yale Law
journal, 58 (1949).
98. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866); Cummings v. Missomi, 71 U.S. 277 (1866).
99. 71 u.s. 2 (1866).
100. Lasser, The Limits ofJudicial Power, 90-92.
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clauses that ensured that the Court would immediately have the opportunity to delete the offending sections of both measures. 1 01
Politicians frequently use the judicial recruitment process to advance
their policy goals. The Reagan administration sought to achieve its social
agenda primarily by staffing the justice department and judiciary with
movement conservatives.I02 William Howard Taft lobbied hard to ensure
that the personnel of the Supreme Court would restrain legislatures imbued with socialistic doctrines.I03 The Truman administration deemphasized legislative efforts to eradicate segregation and instead sought to
create a federal judiciary hostile to Jim Crow institutions. Southern Democrats who were unwilling to vote for civil rights proposals proved willing
to confirm federal justices who were known to be strong proponents of
racial equality.l 04 When the Republicans captured the White House in
1952, they continued to seek judicial solutions for civil rights questions.
Robert Burk notes that although "President Eisenhower [was] unenthusiastic about school desegregation legislation ... , probably [his] greatest contribution to the long-term struggle against Jim Crow was the appointment of integration supporters to Southern federal courts."
Eisenhower's Supreme Court nominees were all known proponents of
black civil rights when they were nominated to the bench, and recent
studies suggest that they were selected for that reason.I05
Politicians in the executive branch also made significant use of the
amicus brief in their successful efforts to have the judiciary promote racial
equality. The Supreme Court began issuing broad rulings in civil rights
cases only after the Truman Administration supported the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund's contentions in Shelley v. Kraemer, I06 Sweatt v. Painter, 1 07 and
Brown v. Board of Education. 1os "President Eisenhower's reported neutrality
in Brown Steven Puro points out, "is belied by the amicus brief submitted
101. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as a Political Process (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), 36; Craig, Chadha, 70.
102. O'Brien, "The Reagan Judges"; Murphy, "Reagan's Judicial Strategy."
103. For example, Walter F. Murphy, "In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft and
Supreme Court Appointments," in Philip Kurland, ed., 1961: The Supreme Court Review (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).
104. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 274-275; Lawrence H._Tribe, God Save This
Honorable Court: How the Choice of Supreme Court justices Shapes Our Histo'ry (New York: New
American Library, 1985), 83-84.
105. Robert Fredrick Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1984), 199; Henry J. Abraham, justices and Presidents: A Political
History of Appointments to the Supreme Court, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985),
251-271; Michael A. Kahn, "Shattering the Myth About President Eisenhower's Supreme
Court Appointments," Presidential Studies Quarterly, 22 (1992).
106. 334 u.s. l (1948).
107. 339 u.s. 629 (1950).
108. 349 U.S. 294 (1954). See Clement E. Vose, Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the
NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967);
Richard Kluger, Simple justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's
Struggle for Equality (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), 251-253, 277, 558-561.
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by his administration in support of the petitioners in that case."I09 Indeed,
in light of assertions about Eisenhower's "hidden hand presidency," scholars might consider the significance of Senator Richard Russell's assertion,
the day Brown was decided, that the Court had become "a pliant tool" in
the hands of the "political arm of the Executive Branch of the Government."110 More generally, Puro suggests that "the U.S. as amicus may be
urging the Court ... to espouse socially unpopular views it would be
politically risky for the executive to adopt." "In this way," he concludes,
"such 'unpopular' or 'progressive' views are transformed into public policy
but the onus of having made the decisions rests on the Court and not upon
the executive."lll
Congress rarely becomes directly involved in litigation, but legislative
input has directly influenced several important legal decisions. As Louis
Fisher points out, representatives "encourage judicial policymaking" by
"pass[ing] statutes that give standing to litigants, provid[ing] fees for attorneys, and establish[ing] separate agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation to bring suit on broad public issues." 112 The Voting Rights Act
of 1965 did not ban the poll tax outright, but Congress declared that such
practices were unconstitutional and ordered the attorney general to initiate the litigation that eventually culminated in the Supreme Court's decision to strike down such levies in Harper v. Virgznia Board of Elections. 113
Lasser suggests that the Court in Ex Parte Milligan may have been swayed
by the presence of prominent Republican lawmakers who served as counsel for the parties attacking the constitutionality of martial law declarations
in the North during the Civil War.I 14 The appeal in Chadha might have
lacked the necessary adversarial parties had the House and Senate not
submitted an amicus brief. Barbara Craig observes that "perhaps because
[congressional] leadership had been unable to stem the tide of legislative
vetoes, the hope was that by keeping the case alive, the court could and
would do so." 11 5
Although the issues raised by many of the cases cited above did not
immediately threaten to disrupt existing political cleavages, with rare exception, legislative deference to the judiciary has taken place concerning
those issues that the major parties are, by their nature, not well structured
to debate. In particular, the Court has also played a major role when
sectional disputes have arisen that crosscut national party alignments, as
we have seen when slavery (and civil rights) pitted the North against the
109. Steven Puro, "The United States as Amicus Curiae," inS. Sidney Ulmer, ed., Courts,
Law, and judicial Processes (New York: Free Press, 1981), 222.
1!0. WilliamS. White, "Ruling to Figure in '54 Campaign," New J'ork Tzmes 103 (May
18, 1954): 20. See Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhown as Lender (New
York: Basic Books, 1982).
Ill. Puro, "The United States as Amicus Curiae," 229.
112. Fisher, Constitutional Dwlogues, 16-17.
113. 383 U.S. 667 (1966). See United States Statutes at Large 1966, 442-443.
114. Lasser, The Limits of judzrial Power, 69.
115. Craig, Chadha, 103.
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South, antitrust pitted the East against the West, and now, when abortion
pits the coasts against the hinterlands. Elected officials often attempt to
facilitate judicial policymaking immediately before a realignment occurs,
but Chadha, Buckley v. Valeo 11 6 (major parts of campaign finance law declared unconstitutional), and Bowsher v. Synar 11 7 (part of budget balancing
act declared unconstitutional) were decided during a period of sustained
dealignment. Indeed, at least one instance of legislative deference, the
congressional decision to refer disputes over black suffrage to the courts,
occurred shortly after a major realignment removed racial issues from
national electoral politics.
This contrast in legal scrutiny of issues that are on and off the political
agenda at any given time helps explain the contemporary judicial practice
of affording more scrutiny to civil liberties claims than to claims of economic right. Many commentators point out that this two-tiered review has
no logical justification, that "the right to enjoy property without unlawful
deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth
a 'personal' right." 11 8 There is, however, a clear political difference between the freedom of contract and the right to privacy. Disputes over
property rights lie at the heart of the New Deal party system. Many disputes
over civil liberties, on the other hand, crosscut that partisan alignment.
Thus, contemporary party moderates often advance economic proposals,
but frequently sidestep social issues, hoping perhaps that these issues will
be resolved by adjudication. The preferred position of civil liberties in the
Supreme Court reflects nothing more than the preferred position of property issues in the New Deal party system.

LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE AS A POLITICAL STRATEGY
Judicial policymaking more frequently intensifies than moderates the
baneful effects that crosscutting issues have on existing partisan cleavages.
Thus, mainstream politicians cannot expect that citizens will continue to
vote on those issues that have traditionally divided the major parties because
the judiciary has taken the responsibility for settling other political controversies. Rather, the available evidence indicates that legislative deference
to the judiciary serves the interests of party moderates and political elites
m obtaining favorable policies on crosscutting issues only when citizens
continue to vote as they have in the past in spite of judicial efforts to settle
other political controversies.
. The judicial policymaking that takes place after legislative and executive
mvitations has consistently favored the interests of the presidential wing
of the dominant national coalition or the elite wings of both major parties.
The Dred Scott decision reflected the overrepresentation of Southerners in
prominent national offices before the Civil War. During Reconstruction,
116. 424 U.S. I (1976).
117.478 U.S. 714 (!986).
118. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. 405 U.S. 538, 552 (!972).
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the Court endorsed the milder policies promoted by the presidential wing
of the Unionist/Republican party rather than the harsher policies preferred by radical Republicans. The series of activist decisions handed down
by the Court at the turn of the twentieth century adopted the laissez-faire
constitutional views of the Gilded Age's legal aristocracy. By the time
Brown was decided, the political leaders and presidential wings of both
national parties wanted to eradicate segregation practices. Finally, lawyers
and opinion elites are far more supportive than the general public of
contemporary Supreme Court decisions that protect such civil liberties as
the right to burn the flag or the right to have an abortion. 11 9
Although the substance of judicial policymaking has secretly pleased
many party moderates, their use of the judiciary to buttress the existing
party system has had more ambiguous consequences. Judicial policymaking typically aggravates political fissures because judges are less likely than
elected officials to find acceptable compromises. Indeed, judges are less
likely than elected officials to be interested in accommodating all parties
to a controversy. Legislation typically reflects a variety of interests, but
cases that cannot be settled out of court are normally decided in favor of
one party or the other_l20 Moreover, a good deal of theory imbibed by
justices insists that "the basic ingredient of decision is principle, and it
should not be compromised and parceled out a little in one case, a little
more in another, until eventually someone receives the full benefit."I2I For
this reason, the judicial process is more prone than the legislative process
to yield fairly well-defined winners and losers. Judicial rulings on the
constitutionality of slavery, antitrust, and abortion policies, for example,
have supported without much reservation the positions taken by proslavery, pro-laissez-faire, and prochoice activists. This judicial willingness to
make more extreme policy decisions than elected officials leaves successful
litigants less willing to accept political compromises and creates opposition to the new status quo among citizens who were willing to tolerate
some compromises but cannot stomach the relatively immoderate position
announced by the Court.
The success or failure of legislative efforts to encourage judicial policymaking thus depends on the extent to which citizens maintain their previous political attachments in the face of what they may perceive as disagreeable judicial decisions. History suggests that party moderates can obtain
favorable Supreme Court rulings that do not significantly damage the
dominant national coalition or existing party system only if at least one of
three conditions is met~ First, mainstream politicians will not suffer substantial harm if the Court makes policies that have broad popular support,
even though political circumstances make their legislative enactment difficult. Such decisions as Gideon v. Wainwright !22 and Griswold v. Connecticut
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Brest, "Who Decides?"
See Murphy and Tannenhaus, "Publicity, Public Opinion and the Court," 993.
Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues, 10 (quoting Chief justice Earl Warren).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).

THE NONMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY

67

have proven to be fairly uncontroversial politically because few citizens in
the late twentieth century vote for candidates who openly promise to deny
lawyers or birth control prescriptions to indigents. Second, mainstream
politicians will not suffer substantial harm if the Court makes policies that
most people do not regard as important enough to consider when making
electoral decisions. INS v. Chadha and Buckley v. Valeo have had little direct
effect on the structure of partisan competition because the voting public
is either unaware of precisely what was decided in these cases or does not
vote for candidates on the basis of their specific positions on campaign
finance reform or the legislative veto.I2 3 Third, mainstream politicians will
not suffer substantial harm if most elites in both major coalitions support
the policies that the courts are making. From 1936 to 1960, the public
could not hold politicians accountable for judicial decisions condemning
segregated institutions because neither the national Democratic party nor
the national Republican party had any interest in overruling Brown and its
progeny.1 24
Nevertheless, a circumstance in which the leading political elites of both
major parties are refusing to challenge controversial Supreme Court decisions is likely to be unstable. Insurgents in the minority party are likely to
"go hunting where the ducks are" in order to win control of their coalition
and realign the party system in their image. In recent years, the emerging
southern wing of the Republican party has used judicial rulings on such
social issues as race and abortion both to bludgeon liberal, eastern Republicanism into oblivion and to detach important partisans of the New Deal
coalition from the Democratic party. Moreover, at least until Webster, judicial policymaking facilitated these conservative Republican efforts by
mobilizing prolife voters while demobilizing prochoice elites. The latter
could continue supporting GOP candidates on economic issues, confident
that courts would make the policies on social issues that they preferred.
The injuries suffered by the Democratic party as a result of such judicial
decisions as Roe, however, can be overestimated. To begin with, the damage has taken place almost exclusively at the presidential level. In virtually
all other electoral offices, Democrats, many of whom campaign on prochoice and pro-civil rights platforms, seem as strong as they have been
throughout the post-World War II era. Moreover, studies repeatedly show
that American voters and political contributors continue 'to be primarily
concerned with pocketbook rather than social issues. Thus, much if not all
of the conservative dominance of recent American presidential policies
may stem from public dissatisfaction with Democratic economic (and foreign) policies, matters that the Warren and early Burger courts did not
123. Of course, the Buckley decision has had major indirect effects on voting choices by
significantly affecting the campaign finance options open to different political entrepreneurs.
124. Taylor Branch's description of Republican and Democratic party efforts during the
1960 national election to woo black voters without antagonizing Southern whites offers an
excellent illustration of the relatively similar civil rights programs of both major parties at
the time. Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-63 (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1988), 312-313.
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concern themselves with to any significant degree. Had President Carter
successfully rescued the hostages in Iran and engineered an economic
boom before the 1980 election, he might have won a landslide over Ronald
Reagan of sufficient magnitude to convince a generation of Republican
party moderates that their coalition could never capture the executive
branch by campaigning on so socially conservative a platform.
Clearly, much more research is needed to determine whether legislative
deference to the judiciary mitigates or exacerbates the influence that crosscutting issues have on existing political cleavages. Nevertheless, one reason exists for thinking that strategy is of some utility, at least in the short
run. When faced with social controversies that threaten to destroy their
political base, party moderates, who presumably have a vested interest in
adopting those tactics that will best preserve their political power, have
repeatedly encouraged judicial policymaking. Diverting issues to the
courtroom may prove to be only a temporary balm in most cases, but to
desperate politicians transitory measures are better than no relief at all. In
a manner reminiscent of democracy, legislative deference to the judiciary
may be the worst strategic approach to disruptive partisan disputes except
for all the others.

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AN ACTUAL DEMOCRACY
No simple formula explains or describes every judicial declaration that
some policy is unconstitutional. Legislative deference to the judiciary is
only one of many historical causes of independent judicial policymaking.
When the Court is temporarily dominated by "holdover[s] from the old
coalition," justices "perform the counter-mqjoritarian functions ascribed
to it by traditional theory."l25 The Hughes Court struck down federal
economic regulations in such cases as Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 126 despite the
best efforts of Democratic party leaders to discourage judicial interference
with the New Deal. Justices have also proved willing to resolve hotly disputed partisan controversies when they perceive that the elected branches
of government are not responding to them. Justice Lewis Powell defended
his willingness to continue Warren Court policymaking,by pointing to "the
sluggishness of the legislative branch in addressing urgent needs for reform."127 Moreover, courts clearly respond to the activities of persons
outside the legislature. Institutional and individual litigants influence the
Supreme Court by the manner in which they frame constitutional issues
and time their presentations. In her study of the Legal Services Organization, Susan Lawrence demonstrates how staff attorneys successfully placed
the constitutional rights of poorer Americans on the judicial agenda dur125. Funston,
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ing the late 1960s and obtained favorable outcomes in most cases. 1 28
Finally, the values of individual justices and the internal dynamics of particular courts obviously have a substantial impact on judicial decision-making. Justices Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black differed considerably in
their willingness to declare laws unconstitutional, even though both jurists
were subject to the same external stimuli from politicians and lawyers while
on the bench. Thus, phenomenon of legislative deference to the judiciary
is best understood as providing an important supplement to these conventional explanations of why justices declare policies unconstitutional.
If persistent judicial policymaking is a consequence of certain relatively
permanent features of political competition in the United States, then the
Court's willingness to exercise its power to declare laws unconstitutional
should not be considered an exceptional event. As long as two-party systems remain susceptible to crosscutting issues and the judiciary presents
a viable alternative forum for decision-making, politicians can be expected
to continue placing responsibility for unwanted political conflicts in the
hands of the justices. Although there may be periods in American history
when courts are relatively inactive, the forces underlying political efforts
to invite judicial policymaking ensure that the federal judiciary will frequently play a prominent role in American politics.
The underlying political structures that give rise to legislative deference
to the judiciary suggest that Warren/Burger/Rehnquist Court activism is
particularly likely to be a political fixture in the near future. Nearly every
political controversy has been nationalized in contemporary American
politics. 1 29 Because national parties can reflect partisan cleavage on only
a few of those issues, party moderates must regularly attempt to organize
many conflicts out of electoral politics. When faced with this issue-overload, the modern "Congress has increasingly found the judicial system a
convenient dumping ground for a number of difficult problems." 1 30 Future politicians will, no doubt, continue to encourage judicial policymaking
on those issues that crosscut the dealigning New Deal party system, and
on those issues that crosscut any future party system. In this political
environment, justices willing to make public policy will have no shortage
of policies to make.
The necessarily limited nature of partisan politics in _two-party systems
has important implications for political movements intent on retrieving
some issue from judicial control. Liberals eager to make abortion a central
issue in upcoming political campaigns, for example, might be less enthusiastic if they realized the probable consequences of their electoral success.
Recent gubernatorial elections in Virginia, New Jersey, and Texas suggest
128. Susan E. Lawrence, The Poor in Court: The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court
Decision Making (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
. 129. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, 76-94; William M. Lunch, The Nationalizatwn of American Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
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that some candidates will profit by highlighting their commitment to abortion rights. 13 1 This emphasis on abortion, however, has typically come at
the expense of more traditional Democratic party issues. In order to appeal
to prochoice voters, most of whom are fairly affluent, such politicians as
Douglas Wilder, Bill Clinton, and Paul Tsongas either muted or abandoned concerns for the poor or labor. This change in political emphasis
suggests that a judicial decision overruling Roe would not necessarily add
to the number of issues at stake in future elections. Rather, candidates
political coalitions and voters will be forced to choose more openly amon~
competing economic and social controversies. Abortion and other social
issues may enter partisan politics only to the extent that certain economic
issues get pushed out.

THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY REVISITED
Constitutional commentators assume that "when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here
and now; it exercises control, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but
against it." 132 Although scholars find the character of judicial review troubling, few would have the justices wholly abandon the practice. Much legal
theorizing consists of different attempts to describe the conditions under
which the "countermajoritarian difficulty" may legitimately be overcome.
Some academics, recognizing that democracy is not the only value constitutional societies prize, maintain that judicial review is justified when
courts protect certain basic individual rights from governmental infringement. Others support judicial review whenever democratic majorities have
consented to be ruled undemocratically. Members of yet another influential school of thought suggest that the judicial power is exercised appropriately when the justices declare unconstitutional those laws that interfere
with democratic processes, be they broadly or narrowly construed. Bruce
Ackerman proclaims that justices should adhere to the principles endorsed
by previous democratic majorities at special constitutional moments. 1 33
The resulting, often vituperative, normative debates over the proper judicial function, however, proceed from a shared conception of the political
context in whichjudicial review normally takes place. Proponents of judicial activism and judicial self-restraint, originalists and noninterpretivists,
think it axiomatic that when justices declare laws unconstitutional, they
overturn the policies preferred by lawmaking majorities.
131. For New Jersey and Virginia, see Dodson and Burnbauer, Election 1989.
132. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 16.
133. Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1991). The canonical works in the substantive rights, originalist, and democratic process
schools of constitutional thought are, respectively, Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Robert H. Bark, The Tempting of America: The
Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), and john Hart Ely, Democracy
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This empirical presupposition cannot withstand any serious examination of American political and legal history. With the important exception
of the New Deal, whenever a prevailing national majority clearly supported
a policy, the Supreme Court declared that policy constitutional. 134 Whenever the Supreme Court declared a policy unconstitutional, no prevailing
national majority clearly supported that policy. Moreover, key actors in the
dominant national coalition typically either facilitated or otherwise blessed
judicial rulings striking down federal and state laws. In many instances of
judicial policymaking, the members of the "prevailing majority" who
enacted the measure declared unconstitutional clearly encouraged the
judiciary to second-guess their handiwork. The legislative invitation to
make social policy in Dred Scott and other cases was expressed in the very
text of the statute passed by Congress. Sometimes, the prevailing majority
in one governmental institution has made a policy decision that the prevailing majority in another institution with at least as much right to speak on
behalf of the American people maintained was unconstitutional. Brown v.
Board of Education, for example, might be aptly subtitled The Truman and
Eisenhower Administrations v. Southern States.

Theories ofjudicial review in a democracy will be of only limited interest
until they correctly describe the circumstances in which judicial policymaking normally takes place. Conventional wisdom properly appreciates that
in a well-ordered democratic republic, law should consist of the deliberate
policy decisions made by a majority of the people's representatives who are
electorally accountable to the public. Thus, the Supreme Court's power to
declare laws unconstitutional seems problematic if in the typical case of
judicial policymaking unelected justices strike down laws that represent
the deliberate policy decisions of legislative majorities that are electorally
accountable to the public. When the actual political histories of the most
important instances of judicial policymaking are examined closely, however, the relationship between judicial review and the democratic requirements of deliberate decision-making, majoritarianism, and political accountability are far more complex than the simplistic models presupposed
by much constitutional commentary.t35
134. The Marshall Court's efforts in the early 1830s to protect i:he rights of Native
Americans may be another example of a truly countermajoritarian ruling. See Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 5 Peters 1 ( 18 31).
Many Supreme Court decisions can be described as countermajoritarian in the sense that
they declare policies unconstitutional that are favored by most Americans. The Supreme
Court's school-prayer and flag-burning decisions come to mind. For reasons that need further elaboration, however, these rulings did not strike down policies preferred by clear
majorities of the people's elected representatives, the democratic standard normally used by
persons concerned with the countermajoritarian problem. Se.e Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch, 16 (quoted above). Of course, decisions inconsistent with populist conceptions of
democracy also present significant theoretical problems that will be explored in future work.
135. Of course, judicial review may be legitimate even when inconsistent with basic
features of democratic governance. Walter Murphy and others have consistently reminded
scholars that the United States is not a pure, but a constitutional democracy committed to
protecting certain values against democratic majorities. See, e.g., Murphy, Fleming, and
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For example,judicial review has not proven in practice to be as antithetical to political accountability as much theory suggests. The Supreme Court
tends to engage in independent judicial policymaking only on those crosscutting issues that voters have not chosen or have been unable to hold
elected officials accountable for. Surveys suggest that few contemporary
voters wish to hold politicians accountable for their stands on abortion,
particularly when doing so would prevent them from voting their economic preferences. Many citizens in antebellum America wished to hold
presidential candidates accountable for their position on slavery, but could
not do so because neither party essayed very clear positions on that issue.
Significantly, when a party arose in the late 1850s that offered voters a clear
choice on slavery, candidates of that party refused to offer voters welldefined positions on economic issues.
A more accurate measure of the relationship between judicial review and
political accountability would examine what happens when most citizens
begin making electoral decisions on the basis of those issues on which the
Court has been engaging in independent judicial policymaking. Here, too,
the record indicates that the justices are fairly responsive to public demands that the Court retreat from earlier decisions. Both the New Deal and
the Civil War suggest that whenever popular majorities elect an entire
government opposed to the direction of recent judicial policymaking, the
justices quickly abandon their effort to make those policies. Neither Dred
Scott nor Carter Coal survived the clear installation of a hostile political
regime. The Supreme Court is simply not structured to impede a determined majority for any length of time. For this reason, judicial decisions
have proven fairly durable only when no such determined majority or
executive exists.
These observations, I should emphasize, are not designed to celebrate
independent judicial policymaking. The central point is simply that all
exercises of the judicial power do not have the same relationship to democratic values. Realistic theories of the judicial function, thus, must examine
the extent to which particular instances of judicial review actually promote
or retard deliberate policymaking, majoritarianism, and political accountability. In some instances, judicial review is clearly inconsistent with ordinary understandings of democratic majoritarianism. The Court's attempt
to strike down the New Deal, for example, does present the classic example
of the "countermajoritarian difficulty." But if American political parties are
not and cannot be structured to resolve every partisan issue that excites
the general public, then judicial review, or some other form of policymaking by unelected officials, will consistently be an integral feature of politics
in the United States.
Scholars may still conclude that judicial policymaking is always undemo-

Harris, 1986, 23-33. Whether judicial review in practice actually advances the values of
constitutional democracy, however, is a question with empirical components that members
of this school of thought do not fully address.
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cratic. If two-party systems cannot serve as adequate vehicles for crosscutting issues, then the democratic solution may be to adopt some other basis
of political competition. When some issues must be removed from electoral debate, democracies should have them resolved by institutions whose
members are not appointed for life and whose decisions can be reversed
by ordinary legislative majorities. Other scholars, however, may insist that
no other form of political competition will better insure deliberate decision-making, majoritarianism, and political accountability. They may further claim that, in the United States, the judiciary is frequently the only
viable institution elected officials can turn to when they are unwilling or
unable to resolve heated political controversies. In this view, democratic
values are better promoted by having some conflicts resolved by justices
appointed and confirmed by elected officials when the practical alternative
is not having those conflicts resolved at all.

